




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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301



2 JAN 1977

Honorable George Bush
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear George:

(U) I have carefully reviewed the Semiannual NSC Intelligence Review which has been submitted to the National Security Council and also the Defense comments that were provided to your staff by Tom Latimer on 17 November 1976. I am concerned that Defense comments have not been incorporated in a specific portion of the review.

(S) I refer to the recommended NSC actions on page 5 of the Executive Summary and the portion on page 37 of the Annex that pertains to the role of the DCI during a major crisis or war. The latter states in part:

"It is equally clear that in such times the President and the National Security Council must make decisions which can affect the vital interests of the nation -- decisions on broad strategy, the disposition and employment of conventional forces, the use of nuclear weapons, and the conduct of negotiations intended to end the crisis or war. These decisions must be supported by intelligence, presumably through a channel which is independent of the Department of Defense." (Underlining supplied)

(S) This recommendation causes me considerable difficulty, especially the way in which it is stated. The capabilities and responsibilities of various elements of the National Foreign Intelligence Community are important considerations in determining the source of military intelligence in support of the disposition and employment of military forces. A discussion of these considerations is needed to support the recommendation. Further, I do not believe that any non-Defense element of the Intelligence Community has the capability of providing the required dedicated support in this area.



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SECRETARY FOR NSC

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
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(S) Although I fully support the need to define more clearly the DCI role in time of major crisis or war, my view is that military intelligence must be provided by the Department of Defense during such periods.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Robert Ellsworth', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Robert Ellsworth

cc:

Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		✓		
2	DDCI		✓		
3	D/DCI/IC	✓			
4	DDS&T				
5	DDI		✓		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	D/DCI/NI				
9	GC				
10	LC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/S				
15	DTR				
16	Asst/DCI				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPS				
19	DCI/SS				
20	D/EE0				
21					
22					
SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks:

For review + comment to DCI

STAT